For a firm, the dual goals -induced by the drive on Extended Producer Responsibility -of meeting environmental regulations and positioning itself as a socially-responsible entity, necessitate the understanding of supply-and demand-side implications as well as product design characteristics. These, in turn, result in a healthy tradeoff between feasible sustainability measures, thus making the implementation of an appropriate option critical for long-term survival. Motivated by our interactions with two Dallas-based reverse-logistics firms, we analyze the tradeoff between two well-known product-recovery approaches: recycling and remanufacturing. Our setting is that of a manufacturer who produces and markets a product with the objective of maximizing profit. A unit of the product consists of two modules -Module A and Module B -that could each be either remanufactured or recycled. Module B incurs a higher per-unit production cost and is also priced higher than Module A. Once a module is recovered via a take-back mechanism, it can be either used in a remanufactured unit or can be further disassembled and recycled to recover its raw material, which can then be used to produce (albeit with different yields) new units of either Module A or Module B. Any unused units of either the complete product, Module A, or Module B, can be disposed. Under this setting, we investigate three options: (i) recycling of Module A, (ii) remanufacturing of Module B, and (iii) recycling of Module A and remanufacturing of Module B.
Introduction
The notion of "Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)" (see, e.g., Subramanian, Gupta, and Talbot, 2009; OECD, 2010; U.S. EPA, 2010) , since its inception in Germany through the packaging ordinance of remanufacturing programs (see, e.g., Ayres, Ferrer, and Van Leynseele, 1997; Ferrer and Whybark, 2000; Guide, 2000; Klose, Speranza, and Van Wassenhove, 2000; Geyer, Van Wassenhove, and Atasu, 2007) provide evidence of the profitability of this practice and also of a blooming "green" market (Ferrer and Swaminathan, 2006; Franke et al., 2006) . Recycling, on the other hand, is a relatively sophisticated process. Recycling first requires the collection, disassembly, and sorting of product parts before sending them through a material recovery process, which extracts raw material that is used in subsequent production (Hart, 1997) . It is important to note that recycling can exploit the substitutability of raw material across the components of a product. In other words, material extracted by recycling a component can be either used to manufacture a new component of the same type or a different component that requires the same material. Therefore, to the extent allowed by the composition of a product, a low-cost module can be recycled to facilitate the production of a high-cost module. Our analysis in this paper examines this substitution capability of recycling.
While the environmental, monetary, and social benefits of both remanufacturing and recycling processes -reduced energy consumption, reduced waste, lower production costs, new business opportunities, more employment opportunities, to name a few -are well documented, managers need to carefully consider the relative impacts of these two processes before investing in an appropriate production strategy.
For example, the practice of remanufacturing typically introduces a lower-priced version of a product that can cannibalize existing demand of higher-priced versions. Moreover, both processes are laborintensive and require a skilled workforce (Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2002; Srivastava, 2007) . Therefore, in the current competitive market, the ability and extent to which customers can be influenced and product design can be tailored become important determinants of their relative benefits.
Over the years, businesses have managed to effectively influence and manipulate consumers' perception of their sustainability measures through innovative advertising campaigns and product-collection techniques. For instance, cellular phone manufacturers often provide a nominal reward to consumers for returning their used cell phones and use social networking sites as an influential marketing strategy (Samsung, 2009) . Governmental programs, that challenge and encourage manufacturers to participate in EPR, also play an important role in altering the take-back quantity. For example, the "TV Recycling Challenge" (U.S. EPA, 2009) initiated in 2009 by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency resulted in the major players of the TV industry collecting more than 8 million pounds of TVs during the first half of 2009. Most major manufacturers continually educate the public on their active efforts in EPR programs and provide numerous avenues through which consumers can participate in these programs, e.g., by purchasing a remanufactured product or by returning used products to a collection center (Samsung, 2009; U.S. EPA, 2009; Kodak, 2010; Xerox, 2010) . As a combined consequence of these efforts, it is reasonable to assume that manufacturers now have the ability to influence product-specific characteristics such as size of the green-consumer segment and the take-back quantity. Indeed, this ability provides an approach to align a manufacturer's strengths with market opportunities. Conversely, changes in these characteristics can also alter the dynamics of a market. It, therefore, becomes crucial to understand the robustness of sustainability measures to such changes. Before introducing our model and the underlying assumptions of our analysis, we briefly discuss the setting and summarizes the major contributions.
Our Setting and Summary of Results
Motivated by our interactions with two Dallas-based reverse-logistics firms, we consider a manufacturer who produces and markets a product with the objective of maximizing profit. A unit of the product consists of two modules -Module A and Module B -that could each be either remanufactured or recycled. Module B incurs a higher per-unit production cost and is also priced higher than Module A. We assume that a product take-back mechanism, which enables the collection of a pre-specified fraction of the sold units, is already in place. Once a module is recovered, it can be either used in a remanufactured unit -by directly substituting the module in that unit -or can be further disassembled and recycled to recover its raw material, which can then be used to produce (albeit with different yields) new units of either Module A or Module B. Any unused units of either the complete product, Module A, or Module B, can be disposed. Under this setting, we investigate three options: (i) recycling of Module A,
(ii) remanufacturing of Module B, and (iii) recycling of Module A and remanufacturing of Module B. Our analysis incorporates (a) demand-side effects due to the presence of green consumers, who are influenced by the presence of the remanufactured version (b) supply-side effects due to the remanufacturing and recycling processes, and (c) impact of product design and composition, e.g., the substitutability of material obtained by recycling Module A to produce Module B.
We summarize our contributions below. Some of the technical terms that appear in the summary below are defined in Section 2.
Theoretical Results:
• We provide a complete theoretical characterization of the regions of optimality of each option mentioned above, first under opportunistic green consumers (Section 4.1) and later under two other alternatives -flexible green consumers (Section 7.1) and dedicated green consumers (Section 7.2) . We also analyze the impact of choosing an option in an ad-hoc manner on the manufacturer's profit and examine the sensitivity of this impact to changes in the supplydemand gap and the take-back fraction (Section 4.2).
• Recognizing that emerging governmental regulations render the disposal cost particularly vulnerable to dis-economies of scale, we examine the impact of non-linear disposal cost on the (i) optimal amount recycled or remanufactured and (ii) choice of an optimal operational strategy (Section 5).
Main Managerial Insights:
• The remanufacturing option has a more prominent role when: (i) disposal costs are moderate and (ii) the product take-back fraction and the fraction of green consumers are both high.
Otherwise, the recycling option is preferable (Section 3.5.2).
• When regular consumers only purchase the regular version of the product, remanufacturing is attractive when the take-back fraction is moderate to high and the fraction of green consumers is neither too low nor too high. When regular consumers purchase both the regular and remanufactured versions of the product, remanufacturing can be preferable even when the fraction of green consumers is low (Section 4).
• When both remanufacturing and recycling are profitable options, a manufacturer who chooses to only remanufacture can always benefit by introducing recycling. However, under certain parametric conditions, recycling alone is the preferred option (Section 4).
• When both the product take-back fraction and the fraction of green consumers are high, there can exist a significant region of the parametric space in which the best option under a non-linear disposal cost differs from that under a linear disposal cost (Section 5.2.1).
• The substitutability of raw material across the modules of the product is more attractive when the take-back fraction is high and the fraction of green consumers is low (Section 6.1).
• When the unsatisfied demand of the remanufactured version is lost or when green consumers do not purchase the regular version of the product, the profits under the two options that include remanufacturing decrease as the fraction of green consumers increases. (Section 6.2).
The Generic Model, Assumptions, and Notation
We start by introducing our generic model; later, in Section 3, we will develop three special cases of the model, corresponding to the three options mentioned above. Section 2.1 justifies our main assumptions and Section 2.2 discusses the impact of green consumers on demand. The notation is developed progressively, as and when required.
Consider a manufacturer who produces and markets a single product, referred to as P 0 . The perperiod market demand for new units of this product is Q 0 , at a per-unit selling price of p 0 . The product consists of two modules -Module A and Module B -that could each be either remanufactured or recycled. The per-unit costs of manufacturing these two modules by acquiring virgin material (from external suppliers) are c a 0 and c b 0 , respectively. The manufacturer seeks a strategic decision on whether to remanufacture or recycle Module A and/or Module B. We assume that each module can be remanufactured only once and a product take-back mechanism is already in place (Geyer, Van Wassenhove, and Atasu, 2007) . In steady state, an α fraction, 0 < α < 1, of the (sold) product P 0 is collected for either remanufacturing or recycling or disposal. Typically, the disposal cost of a module is proportional to its weight (Lee, Ellenbecker, and Moure-Ersaso, 2004) . We, therefore, assume a per unit (i.e., linear) disposal cost for a module. Later, in Section 5, we also examine non-linear disposal costs. Furthermore, disposal processes of different modules may vary significantly. For instance, some modules can simply be sent to a landfill while others may require incineration or specialized treatment before disposal (e.g., toxic waste). To allow for this generality, the disposal costs of the two modules are assumed to be different. The disposal cost of Module A (resp., Module B) is denoted as c a l (resp., c b l ). We now discuss the costs involved in the remanufacturing and recycling processes. 
Linearity of Remanufacturing and Recycling Costs
As mentioned in Section 1.1, both the remanufacturing and recycling processes involve several intermediate steps, including disassembly of the used products, repair, reconditioning, cleaning/polishing, further disassembling for recycling, and smelting. Our interactions with two Dallas-based reverse-logistics companies, Product Support Services, Inc. (http://www.productsupportservices.com) and Round2 Inc.
(http://www.round2.net), revealed that disassembly, repair, and the further dismantling needed for recycling, are all steps that are typically labor intensive and require that each product be treated individually. In the case of these two companies, once products are collected, each unit is examined separately to identify defects and then disassembled to recover the required modules. The disassembly cost of a module depends on several aspects, including the level of complexity of the disassembly, the sensitivity of the module to damages, and the end value of the recovered module. Consequently, different types of modules vary in their disassembly processes and the corresponding costs, and there is typically no economy of scale. Furthermore, the condition of each recovered module determines the remanufacturing activities (repair, cleaning/reconditioning, etc.) needed for that module and each such activity is performed by a skilled labor force. Therefore, the cost associated with remanufacturing also does not typically enjoy any significant scale economy. Similarly, in the recycling process, the recovered modules are first further disassembled to obtain their sub-parts and then categorized according to the composition, before being sent for extraction of raw material. Although the subsequent smelting process does exhibit economy of scale, the corresponding cost is significantly lower than that of the labor-intensive disassembly and categorization processes. Therefore, in the subsequent analysis, we assume per-unit costs for the disassembly, remanufacturing, and recycling processes and also allow these Figure 1 illustrates the possible recovery options available for the manufacturer.
Note: Our purpose in defining the costs corresponding to the individual activities, e.g., disassembly, remanufacturing, disposal, etc., is to enable a meaningful interpretation of the conditions that arise later in our analysis. We do not necessarily study the sensitivity of the results with respect to each of these costs.
Consumer Behavior and Demand-Side Effects
Recall our discussion in Section 1 on the differing demand-side effects on remanufacturing and recycling.
We categorize consumers into two classes: (i) regular consumers and (ii) green consumers, and assume that the latter class represents a β fraction of the market demand M . When there is no remanufactured product in the market, we do not distinguish between these two segments and assume that consumer valuations λ ∼ U [0, 1] (Atasu, Sarvary, and Van Wassenhove, 2008) . Thus, the price p 0 ≤ 1 and the demand for the product P 0 is Q 0 = M (1 − p 0 ). When only the recycling option is chosen, raw material is recovered and reused. In this case, we do not distinguish between the new and recycled products and continue to refer to either product simply at P 0 . Next, we examine the impact of the introduction of a lower-quality product at a cheaper price on the total demand.
We assume the remanufactured product, referred to as P r , is priced lower than p 0 . The introduction of P r impacts demand in two distinct ways: (i) it can cannibalize the market share of P 0 and (ii) it may create new demand for P r (Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2009 ). We assume that regular consumers value P r lower than P 0 , while green consumers value both versions the same. Thus, when both P 0 and P r are in the market, green consumers purchase P r . It is straightforward to derive explicit expressions for total demand for both products under the following two cases: (i) regular consumers only purchase P 0 , and (ii) a fraction of regular consumers purchase P r . To elaborate, consider the situation where both P 0 and P r are in the market. Let the price of P r be p r and its valuation by regular consumers be δλ, where 0 ≤ δ < 1 (Debo, Toktay, and Van Wassenhove, 2005) . Then, (a) if p r > δp 0 , then we have (λ − p 0 ) > (δλ − p r ). Therefore, regular consumers do not purchase product P r . In this case, the demand for P 0 isQ 0 = (1 − β)M (1 − p 0 ) and the demand for P r is Q r = βM (1 − p r ), (b) if p r ≤ δp 0 , a fraction of the regular consumers, who purchased P 0 in the absence of P r , switch to P r . The per unit disposal cost of Module A (resp., B). c a n (resp., c b n ) The per unit cost of producing Module A (resp., B) from recycled material. α
In this case,Q
The take-back fraction of P 0 . β
The fraction of green consumers in the market.
M
The size of the market. λ (resp., δλ)
Regular consumers' valuation of P 0 (resp., P r ), 0 ≤ δ < 1. are similar to those derived in Atasu, Sarvary, and Van Wassenhove (2008) . Note that under our three options of interest (Section 1.2), the supply of P r is bounded from above by the take-back quantity αQ 0 .
Consider the case when both P 0 and P r exist in the market. If the supply of P r exceeds Q r , then green consumers purchase P r ; otherwise, we treat the additional demand as lost. Thus, the green consumers are opportunistic in their purchasing behavior. Later, in Section 7, we also address two alternatives where green consumers are: (i) flexible, i.e., purchase P 0 when the supply of P r is not sufficient to meet its demand (Section 7.1) and (ii) dedicated, i.e., do not purchase P 0 under both Options 1 and 2 (Section 7.2).
The setting of the generic model discussed above results in eight distinct production options: remanufacturing or recycling A and/or B. However, as will be discussed below, the primary tradeoff is between the relative increases in profitability from the substitutability of material (recycling Module A and using the resulting raw material for producing Module B) and the demand-side effects of the remanufactured product P r . We, therefore, focus on three options that help us analyze this tradeoff.
Analysis of Three Environmentally-Responsible Options
First, we briefly discuss the substitutability of material across the modules (Section 3.1) and then identify three production options that have the ability to exploit both supply-and demand-side effects and the substitutability of material. Sections 3.2-3.4 analyze the models corresponding to the three options. Finally, we justify the need for a detailed comparison of the three options in Section 3.5.
Substitutability of Raw Materials
As mentioned earlier, relative to Module A, Module B incurs a higher per-unit production cost and is priced higher. Thus, it becomes interesting to investigate the use of raw material obtained by recycling Module A to produce Module B. Recycling a superior module (Module B) to facilitate the production of an inferior module (Module A) is not a typical practice in the industry and, therefore, ignored in our discussion. Next, we state the conditions assumed for analyzing the substitution:
1. Material extracted by recycling one unit of Module A (resp., Module B) can be used to produce one new unit of Module A (resp., Module B), 2. Material extracted by recycling one unit of Module A is a θ fraction (0 < θ < c a 0 /c b 0 ) of that required to produce one new unit of Module B, Consider the following three options:
• Option 1: Recycling Module A only.
• Option 2: Remanufacturing Module B only.
• Option 3: Recycling Module A and Remanufacturing Module B.
Under Option 1, there is only one product (i.e., P 0 ) in the market. In this case, the ability to extract raw material from used modules and use it for subsequent production may allow the manufacturer to lower production cost. Also, observe that Option 1 has the ability to exploit substitutability. Thus, Option 1 captures the supply-side impact of recycling and the substitutability of raw material. Under Option 2, both P 0 and P r exist in the market. The green consumers switch from P 0 to P r , resulting in the demand for P 0 to decrease as compared to that under Option 1. Moreover, the presence of the lower-priced P r creates additional demand from low-end consumers. Therefore, despite the reduced demand for P 0 , Option 2 has the ability to significantly enhance the manufacturer's profit. As our subsequent analysis will reveal, the tradeoff between Option 1 and 2 is indeed healthy. Option 3 is a generalization of Options 1 and 2. Of particular interest to us are conditions under which both the recycling of Module A and the remanufacturing of Module B are nontrivially used in an optimal solution under Option 3. Together, these three options provide a setting that is appropriate to analyze supplyand demand-side effects as well as the substitutability of raw material. These options, therefore, will be the focus of our subsequent analysis.
Option 1: Recycling Module A Only
The product flow under this scenario is illustrated in Figure 2 . Let r 1 be the fraction of the collected products that is disassembled to recover Module A. Thus, (1 − r 1 ) fraction of the collected products is disposed. Furthermore, after recovering Module A, the corresponding units of Module B are disposed at a per-unit cost of c b l . Let ψ 1 be the fraction of recovered material that is used to produce Module A. Thus, (1 − ψ 1 ) fraction of the recovered materials is used to produce Module B. Recall from Section 2.2 that the demand for P 0 under this option is Q 0 = M (1 − p 0 ). The profit Π 1 under Option 1 can be written as follows. 
The optimal solution is:
Otherwise Figure 3 represents the product flow under this option. The corresponding demandQ 0 (resp., Q r ) for product P 0 (resp., P r ) at a per-unit price p 0 (resp., p r ) is as derived in Section 2.2. Note that Q r is bounded above by the take-back quantity αQ 0 . Let r 2 denote the fraction of the collected products that is disassembled to recover Module B. It follows immediately that r 2 ≤ min{1, Q r /αQ 0 }. The profit function Π 2 is as follows.
Option 2: Remanufacturing Module B Only
The optimal solution is as follows: 3.4 Option 3: Recycling Module A and Remanufacturing Module B Figure 4 represents the product flow under this case. Let r 3 (resp., r 4 ) denote the fraction of the collected products on which the disassembly of Module A (resp., Module B) is carried out for recycling (resp., remanufacturing). Recall that r 4 ≤ min{1, Q r /αQ 0 }. As observed earlier, the profit functions under recycling alone and remanufacturing alone differ significantly due to changes in the nature of the demand. Therefore, to incorporate these demand-side effects in the profit function of Option 3, we introduce a binary variable y ∈ {0, 1}, where y = 1 if only Module A is recycled (i.e., there is no remanufacturing of Module B) and y = 0, otherwise (i.e., Module B is remanufactured and there is no recycling). Let Π 3 denote the profit function under Option 3. Then, we have
Note that Option 1 is a special case of Option 3, corresponding to y = 1 and r 4 = 0. Similarly, Option 2 is a special case corresponding to y = 0 and r 3 = 0. The optimal solution for Option 3 is as follows.
Otherwise
We are interested in analyzing Options 1-3 under the following practically-relevant conditions:
(A) The profit margin of P 0 is strictly positive, i.e., (B) The cost saving offered by recycling a unit of Module A is strictly positive, i.e.,
Note that, in this case, we have r 1 = 1 under Option 1.
(C) The cost saving offered by a unit of the remanufactured product P r is strictly positive, i.e.,
(D) Both recycling of Module A and remanufacturing of Module B are nontrivially used in an optimal solution under Option 3, i.e.,
Under the conditions above, letZ 1 ,Z 2 , andZ 3 , denote the profits under Options 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Table 2 .
Note: As defined in Table 2 ,
. Observe that K 1 captures the cost saving due to less disposals of Module A and/or B, the cost saving due to material substitutability, and the costs related to the recycling process. Similarly, K 2 captures the revenue of P r , the cost saving due to less disposals of Module B, and the costs related to the remanufacturing process. For simplicity of exposition, in the subsequent analysis, we refer to K 1 (resp., K 2 ) as the per unit cost savings from recycling (resp., remanufacturing).
Parametric Description Economic Interpretation Expression
Profit from P 0 when there is no take-back mechanism in place.
Cost of disposal of a unit of Module A and B. 
Justifying the Need for a Detailed Comparison
In general, the tradeoff between the three production strategies -Options 1, 2, and 3 -is complex.
As observed earlier, the presence of the remanufactured product P r alters the behavior of the green consumers. Also, its price p r has the power to adjust the demand for the new product P 0 that is generated by regular consumers. Furthermore, the (relative) values of the various cost parameters also play an important role in the relative profitabilities of the three options. In this section, we justify the need, via two specific examples, for a detailed comparison of these options. Our first analysis (Section 3.5.1) shows that a choice solely made by either focusing on a market-based strategy or an operations-based strategy may not always lead to an optimal choice. The second example (Section 3.5.2)
demonstrates how an increase in the disposal cost can alter the optimal choice from Option 1 to Option 2 and, again, back to Option 1.
Inadequacy of Market-Based and Operations-Based Strategies
In general, (i) a market-based strategy that chooses an option based only on revenues and (ii) an operations-based strategy that focuses only on the costs incurred, can both result in the selection of an inferior option. To highlight the importance of incorporating both market-side and operations-side effects, we illustrate a situation whereZ 1 >Z 2 despite the corresponding cost (C 1 ) under Option 1 being strictly greater than that under Option 2 (C 2 ). Consider the following conditions:
(i) Both Options 1 and 2 are profitable, i.e.,Z 1 > 0 andZ 2 > 0.
(ii) The demand for the remanufactured product P r exceeds the take-back quantity, i.e., Q r > αQ 0 .
(iii) The substitutability of material recovered by recycling Module A in the production of Module B is a profitable activity, i.e., θ(
(iv) Regular consumers do not purchase the remanufactured product, i.e., p r > δp 0 .
Under these conditions, we have:
We derive a condition under which C 1 > C 2 . That is, we want
Substituting the values of Q 0 andQ 0 , we have,
Let the revenue from adopting Option 1 (resp., Option 2) be R 1 (resp., R 2 ). Then, if
we have
Since the cost saving from remanufacturing is strictly positive, we have Figure 5 graphically represents conditions (1) and (2) above. In the figure,
. The shaded area in Figure 5 represents the domain of the pair (β, α) for which (i)
To summarize, both market-and operations-side effects need to be considered when choosing the better of the recycling and remanufacturing options.
Impact of Disposal Costs on the Selection of a Production Strategy
To illustrate the sensitivity of the optimal choice with respect to the cost parameters, we observe the change in the better choice (among Options 1 and 2) with a change in the disposal cost. We again focus on the case where 
In the discussion below, we refer to this curve as Curve 1 (resp., Curve 2 and Curve 3) and focus on the point (β,ᾱ) in Figure 6 .
Option1 Figure 6(b) ) and, hence, Option 2 becomes better than Option 1. However, as c i l , i = 1, 2, increase further, the disposal cost under Option 2 increases at a higher rate than that under Option 1 and, consequently, Option 1 again becomes the better option. Thus, the range of the disposal cost for which Option 1 dominates Option 2 and vice-versa can consist of disjoint segments. The key driver of this behavior is the interaction between the supply-and demand-side effects.
Figure 7: Domains of Optimality Under p r > δp 0 . The Expressions for A i (resp., K i ), i = 1, 2, 3, are in Table 3 (resp., Table 2 ) and Parameter a 1 is Defined in the Proof of Theorem 1.
Theoretical Analysis
Our purpose in this section is a comparative analysis of the three options. Section 4.1 provides a complete mapping of the domains of optimality of each option and Section 4.2 quantifies the impact of choosing a suboptimal strategy on profit. Several useful managerial insights on the selection of one of these options under typical parametric settings are provided later in Section 6. The proofs of technical results are provided in the Appendix.
Mapping the Domains of Optimality
Together, our next two results (Theorems 1 and 2) characterize the region where the optimal profit from Option 1 is higher than that from Option 2. Theorem 1 addresses the case when regular consumers do not purchase the remanufactured product (i.e., the demand for this product is created only from green consumers) while Theorem 2 identifies the regions when green consumers and (a portion of) regular consumers purchase the remanufactured product. Figures 7 and 8 provide a pictorial representation of the region of superiority of either option. The shaded area represents the region in which Option 2 is optimal. The expressions for A i and B i (resp., K i ), i = 1, 2, 3, are provided in Table 3 (resp., Table 2 ).
The parametric constants a i , i = 1, 2, . . . , 5, are defined in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2. 
where a 1 =
(1−pr)
Next we characterize the case when a subset of regular consumers purchase P 0 , while others purchase P r . 
, and a 4 = (δp 0 − p r ).
To gain intuition on the domains of optimality, let us focus on the points (β i , α * ), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, in Figure 7 and 8. At (β i , α * ), i = 1, 2, the demand for P r is less than the take-back quantity. As we move from (β 1 , α * ) to (β 2 , α * ), the fraction β of green consumers in the market increases. This does not affect Option 1. However, the supply-demand gap of P r reduces with an increase in β. This, in turn, impactsZ 2 positively in two ways: (i) the cost savings due to remanufacturing of Module B increases and (ii) the total revenue from P r increases. Hence,Z 2 increases and eventually surpassesZ 1 .
As β increases further, the increasing demand of P r eventually exceeds the total take-back quantity (e.g., at point (β 3 , α * )). After this point, the negative impact of further increasing β onZ 2 is twofold:
(i) lost sales increase due to a limited supply of P r and (ii) demand for P 0 decreases, reducing revenue.
Meanwhile,Z 1 remains unaffected by an increase in β. Thus,Z 2 decreases and eventually is lower thañ Z 1 , resulting in Option 1 again becoming optimal (e.g., at point (β 4 , α * )).
Recall that our interest, with respect to Option 3, is when both remanufacturing and recycling are nontrivially used. Clearly, under the conditions when the nontrivial use of both remanufacturing and recycling is an optimal solution of Option 3, the corresponding profit will be higher than that of both Options 1 and 2 (since Option 3 is a generalization of Options 1 and 2). However, if the manufacturer decides on using both remanufacturing and recycling under all conditions (i.e., r 2 = 1 and Table 3 and Parameters a i , i = 2, 3, . . . , 5, are Defined in the Proof of Theorem 2. r 3 = min{1, Q r /αQ 0 }), then such a greedy policy (which we will conveniently refer to as Option 3 G ) may not be optimal over all settings of the parameters. In other words, the simultaneous use of recycling and remanufacturing motivated by their individual profitabilities may not necessarily be an optimal policy. To illustrate, consider the case when K 1 > 0 and K 2 > 0 (i.e., both recycling and remanufacturing individually provide positive cost savings, which in turn implies that both options are individually profitable). Then, Option 3 G may be less profitable than Option 1. An intuitive explanation can be provided as follows: while using Option 3 G can reduce the cost of meeting total customer demand by exploiting both recycling of Module A and remanufacturing of Module B, the presence of P r in Option 3 G reduces the total demand for P 0 (as compared to Option 1) and creates additional demand for P r . This impacts the profit, sayZ 3 G , under Option 3 G in several ways: (i) a reduction in the cost of production due to recycling and remanufacturing of the modules, (ii) an increase in the revenue by capturing a portion of low-end consumers, and (iii) a reduction in the revenue due to a lower demand for P 0 . Thus, when the profit margin of P 0 is higher than that of P r and the demand for P r is not substantial (small values of β), it is possible for the profit under Option 1 to be higher than that under Option 3 G . The characterization in Theorem 3 below formally confirms this intuition.
The tradeoff above between Options 1 and 3 G arises primarily due to the demand-side effect on profit.
However, under both Options 2 and 3 G , products P 0 and P r are in the market. Since the corresponding prices p 0 and p r are exogenous, the demand for these two products under both the options is the same. Therefore, it is immediate thatZ 3 G >Z 2 . The following lemma formally establishes this result.
To summarize, under some parameter settings, recycling alone can be optimal. However, a manufacturer who adopts remanufacturing alone can always benefit by introducing recycling.
Although Option 3, by definition, is capable of providing a higher profit than both Options 1 and 2, the implementation of Option 3 necessitates developing the infrastructure for both recycling and remanufacturing. Consequently, one has to consider a host of issues -availability of resources, ability to build the required infrastructure, budgetary restrictions, etc. -before investing in both processes.
Therefore, it becomes important to assess the incremental advantage of Option 3 over Options 1 and 2.
If the better of Options 1 and 2 is capable of closely approximating the profit from Option 3, then a manufacturer may prefer to adopt a single sustainability measure. The following result establishes a worst-case guarantee on the ratio of these two quantities, under the assumption that the total profit from P 0 exceeds the total disposal cost of its collected units (i.e., K 3 ≥ αK 4 ). 
Quantification of the Impact of adopting a Suboptimal Strategy on Profit
A typical manufacturing setting may impose numerous restrictions, e.g., a tight budget, lack of required skills, geographical and political considerations, on the selection of an optimal production strategy.
In such scenarios, it is worthwhile to understand the impact of choosing a suboptimal strategy on the manufacturer's profit. This goal, in turn, necessitates estimating the gap between the profits of the optimal strategy and the suboptimal choice. In this section, we focus on Options 1 and 2 and theoretically analyze the behavior of (Z 1 −Z 2 ) with changes in the take-back fraction (α) and the fraction of green consumers (β).
For brevity, we restrict this discussion to conditions that are commonly observed in practice. While the fraction β of green consumers for a product is heavily influenced by the characteristics of its industry, it is typically reasonable to assume that the supply of P r is sufficient to meet its demand. That is, αQ 0 ≥ Q r . Also, we assume that regular consumers derive a higher utility from consuming P 0 than from P r (Atasu, Sarvary, and Van Wassenhove, 2008; Debo, Toktay, and Van Wassenhove, 2005) . Accordingly, we limit our analysis to the case where regular consumers purchase only P 0 , i.e., p r ≥ δp 0 .
As a result,Q 0 = M (1 − β)(1 − p 0 ) and Q r = M β(1 − p r ). Note that the condition αQ 0 ≥ Q r implies that αβ + a 1 β − α ≤ 0, where a 1 = (1−pr)
(1−p 0 ) (see Theorem 1). Hence, β ≤ α (α+a 1 ) . Let β = γ α (α+a 1 ) , where 0 < γ ≤ 1 measures the demand-supply mismatch of P r . For a fixed value of α, an increase in γ implies an increase in β, resulting in the demand for P r to increase and the demand for P 0 to decrease (due an increasing number of green consumers switching to P r ). Therefore, as γ increases, the demand supply-gap decreases. Consequently, the number of units remanufactured under Option 2 increases, resulting in a decrease in the number of modules disposed. Note that this does not impact the profit of Option 1. Under the above conditions, we have,
Figures 9(a) and (c) illustrate the behavior of (Z 1 −Z 2 ) against the take-back fraction α. The corresponding percentage increase in profit from the superior option are illustrated in Figures 9(b) and (d) respectively. Note that Figure 9 (a) demonstrates this behavior under the assumptions that (i) the cost of disposal of one product (i.e., one unit each of modules A and B) is significantly higher than the cost savings derived from recycling a unit of Module A (i.e., K 4 > K 1 ) and (ii) the per-unit profit of P 0 is significantly higher than that of P r (i.e., (K 3 − a 1 K 2 ) > 0). When α is fixed and is a low-to-moderate value, the contribution of the profit from P 0 is significant in bothZ 1 andZ 2 . Note that for a fixed value of α, the value ofZ 1 does not vary with a change in γ. At low values of γ, the demand-supply gap of P r is large. As γ increases, this mismatch between demand and supply of P r reduces, resulting in a decrease in the total disposal cost and an increase in the revenue of P r . However, the improved cost savings due to fewer disposals and the increased demand of P r are not sufficient to compensate for the drop in demand of P 0 (due to the relatively high profit of P 0 as compared to P r ). Therefore, Z 2 decreases, causing (Z 1 −Z 2 ) to increase. At higher values of α, the impacts of increasing γ are as follows: (i) β increases, creating significant demand for P r , and (ii) the amount of disposal under Option 2 reduces. Hence, (Z 1 −Z 2 ) decreases (Figure 9(a) ).
The behavior of (Z 1 −Z 2 ), when K 4 ≤ K 1 and the difference between the per-unit profits of P 0 and P r is small (i.e., (K 3 − a 1 K 2 ) < 0), is illustrated in Figure 9 (c). In this case, for a fixed value of α, as γ increases, the demand for P r increases. Since the difference between the profits from P 0 and P r is small and the disposal cost is low relative to the cost savings due to remanufacturing, the increasing market size of P r compensates for the loss in revenue due to the reducing demand for P 0 . Hence, an increase in γ positively impactsZ 2 . SinceZ 1 does not benefit from an increase in γ, the value of (Z 1 −Z 2 ) decreases.
In Figure 9 (a), for a given value of γ, the marginal increase in (Z 1 −Z 2 ) decreases as α increases.
This behavior can be intuitively explained as follows. Observe that an increase in α results in an increase in β. This impacts the behavior of profit under both options in several ways: (i) an increase in the revenue from P r due to the growing green-consumer segment, (ii) an increase in the number of modules disposed under Option 2 due to an increase in the take-back quantity, and (iii) a reduction in the profit from P 0 under Options 1 and 2 (since K 4 > K 1 ). Therefore, the profit from Option 1 monotonically reduces with increasing α. Since (i) the profit derived from P r is less compared to that from P 0 and
(ii) the impact of α on Option 2 is non-monotonic, we see that the reduction in profit under Option 2 reduces with an increase in α (and β). This results in the marginal increase in (Z 1 −Z 2 ) to decrease.
Consider the case illustrated in Figure 9 (c). Observe that for a given value of γ, the marginal increase in (Z 1 −Z 2 ) increases as α increases. This can be explained as follows. In this case, the disposal cost is less compared to the savings due to remanufacturing and, furthermore, the difference between the per-unit profits from P r and P 0 is small. Hence, the positive impact of increasing α on the profit under Option 2 starts increasing at a higher rate than the negative impact due to the decreasing demand of P 0 , causing the marginal improvement to increase.
Dis-economy of Scale in Disposal Cost
Since EPR strongly emphasizes responsible product-recovery mechanisms, it is reasonable to expect tighter restrictions on product disposals in the future (Gui et al., 2010) . For instance, EU regulations specify weight limits for disposals across industries and impose substantial penalties for exceeding these thresholds (Grassroots Recycling Network, 1996) . Consequently, among all the costs considered in our analysis, disposal costs are the most vulnerable to scale dis-economies. In fact, instances of diseconomies in waste disposal occur in many high-tech industries (Grossman, 2004; The Guardian, 2009; Macauley et al., 2001 ).
Our first goal in this section is to derive optimal solutions under Options 1 and 2 in the presence of dis-economy of scale in disposal cost (Theorem 4). We then examine the potential loss of profit due to the (erroneous) assumption of linear disposal cost in deciding the production strategy. In particular,
we investigate (i) the impact of nonlinearity in disposal cost on the selection of a production strategy (Section 5.2.1) and (ii) the impact of assuming a linear cost of disposal (when the actual cost is nonlinear)
on the manufacturer's profit (Section 5.2.2).
Options 1 and 2 under Dis-economy of Scale in Disposal Cost
We assume a specific functional form for the nonlinear disposal cost. Typically, the cost of disposal depends on the weight (or volume) of the waste. Recall that a unit of P 0 consists of a unit each of modules A and B. As discussed earlier in Section 3.1, Module B incurs a higher per-unit production cost relative to Module A. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that the weight of one unit of Module B is higher than that of Module A. Specifically, we let the weight of a unit of Module A be equal to ω fraction, 0 < ω ≤ 1, of the weight of a unit of Module B. Furthermore, for simplicity, we normalize the weight of Module B to 1. Our interest is in the case when the marginal cost of disposal increases with the number of modules disposed. We, therefore, let the disposal cost to be an exponential function of the total weight of the modules disposed. Let x 1 and x 2 denote the number of units of Module A and Module B to be disposed. Then, for constants η > 1 and b 0 > 0, the corresponding disposal cost is
In the presence of the above scale dis-economy, we denote Option 1 (resp., Option 2) by Option 1 D (resp., Option 2 D ). The material flow under Option 1 D (resp., Option 2 D ) is the same as that in Figure 2 (resp., Figure 3 ). Theorem 4 specifies the optimal solution under each option. Recall that r 1 (resp., r 2 ) is the fraction of collected products disassembled to recover Module A (resp., Module B) for recycling (resp., remanufacturing).
Theorem 4 (a) Let r * 1 be the optimal solution for Option 1
where
Linear vs. Non-Linear Disposal Cost
An immediate question that arises is whether the nonlinearity in disposal cost can change the choice of the preferred production strategy (as compared to that under linear disposal cost). In Section 5.2.1, we answer this question in the affirmative. For brevity, we restrict our discussion to the case where (i) regular consumers do not switch to P r and (ii) the demand for P r is substantial and exceeds the take-back quantity. Another interesting issue is the impact of mis-estimation in the disposal cost on profit. In Section 5.2.2, we obtain a worst-case bound on the profit obtained by (incorrectly) assuming a linear disposal cost, when the incurred cost is, in fact, nonlinear.
Impact on the Preferred Production Strategy
For purpose of illustration, we focus on the case where p r > δp 0 and Q r > αQ 0 . The first condition 
For a linear disposal cost, under the same conditions as above, the conditionZ 1 >Z 2 is equivalent to (see Theorem 1),
where the constants K i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, are as defined in Theorem 1. Observe that Figure 10 provides a graphical representation of the impact of the assumed non-linearity in disposal cost; the expressions for A 1 and A 3 are in Table 3 (Section 4.1). Of particular interest is the shaded region, where Option 1 is optimal 
Importance of Accurately Assessing Disposal Costs
An accurate estimation of disposal costs is often challenging and expensive. Therefore, a natural question for a business is whether the use of valuable resources for this estimation can be avoided by conveniently assuming these costs to be linear. It is clear from the discussion above that such an assumption can influence the choice between remanufacturing and recycling, if the realized disposal costs are nonlinear. lower bounds on these ratios. There is another context in which the bounds developed below could be useful. As mentioned earlier, disposal costs are the most vulnerable to dis-economies of scale due to expected tighter federal regulations. Thus, even if the current incurred cost of disposal is linear in volume, it might be advantageous for managers to estimate the impact on profit should there develop scale dis-economies in the near future.
Theorem 5
It is instructive to get a sense of the lower bounds above under reasonable values of the parameters.
Recall that the manufacturer's per-unit profit when there is no product take-back mechanism in place is K 3 ; let this "base" profit be 30%. Furthermore, let the cost saving due to recycling (K 1 ) be 30% of the base profit, the cost saving due to remanufacturing (K 2 ) be 50% of the base profit, and the disposal cost under a linear structure be 5% of the base profit. Additionally, letQ 0 /Q 0 = 0.7, the product take-back fraction (α) be 70%, and the fraction of green consumers (β) be 30%. Then,Z 1 = 0.3525Q 0 andZ 2 = 0.3945Q 0 . Thus,Z 1 /Z 2 = 1.2. In this case, we havẽ
Since the take-back fraction (α) and the fraction of green consumers (β) can vary significantly across industries, consider the case when these fractions are relatively small. Let α = 0.4, β = 0.1, and let all the other parameters be as same as above. Then, we haveZ 1 = 0.294Q 0 andZ 2 = 0.354Q 0 . Therefore, 
Influence of the Ability of Sustainability: A Comparative Analysis
Under Options 2 and 3, the manufacturer produces and markets P r , the demand for which depends on the fraction of green consumers (β). However, the supply of P r depends on the take-back fraction (α). In the presence of a supply-demand gap, the manufacturer can, therefore, either influence green-consumer behavior and/or alter the take-back mechanism. Also, the extent of material substitutability (θ) can be impacted through innovative product design (Allenby, 2000) . Improving material substitutability can alleviate the cost of recycling, which is typically a much more sophisticated process than remanufacturing. Accordingly, we define the manufacturer's ability of sustainability as a combined measure of α, β, and θ.
Our purpose in this section is twofold: (i) to illustrate the significant influence of the ability of sustainability on the profits from both recycling and remanufacturing and (ii) to understand the role of varying ability of sustainability in the tradeoff between recycling and remanufacturing. Our parameter setting for this analysis is as follows. As before, we let the base profit K 3 to be 30%. Furthermore, let p 0 = 0.85, p r = 0.40, and the disposal cost of a unit of P 0 be 5% of the base profit. The value of δ (Section 2.2) determines the switching of regular consumers from P 0 to P r . Under our assumed values, this switch occurs when δ ≥ p r /p 0 = 0.40/0.85 = 0.47 (see Section 2.2). Similarly, sinceQ 0 ≥ 0, we have (1 − δ − p 0 + p r ) ≥ 0 (Lemma 2), which results in δ ≤ 0.55. Therefore, in our analysis we impose δ ≤ 0.55. The values for K 1 and K 2 will be specified as and when required.
Impact of Substitutability on the Optimal Profit Under Options 1 and 3
We assume that the use of material extracted by recycling a unit of Module A in producing a unit of Module B enhances the cost saving by 10% of the base profit as compared to using it to produce a unit of Module A. Note that material substitutability is relevant only for recycling and, therefore, only impacts Options 1 and 3. It is intuitive that as θ increases, the per-unit profits under both these options increase. However, the behavior of the marginal increase in profit with an increase in θ is not
Our interest is in understanding the marginal increase in ∆Z i with an increase in the ability of sustainability.
Since the presence of green consumers does not impact the profit under Option 1, we focus only on changes in α. Figure 11(a) illustrates the behavior of ∆Z 1 with changes in α and K 1 . Observe that the marginal increase in ∆Z 1 : (i) decreases as α increases and (ii) decreases as K 1 increases. This behavior can be explained as follows. As α increases, both the total volume of disposal and the volume of Module A recycled increase. However, the increase in the former exceeds the increase in the latter.
Therefore, although the disposal cost is lower than the cost saving from substitution, the net increase in profit reduces. Consequently, the marginal increase in ∆Z 1 decreases as α increases. Next, consider the case where α is fixed and K 1 increases. Note that both the increase in substitutability and the cost saving from recycling contribute towardsZ 1 . However, the positive impact from substitutability is bounded from above at 10% of the base profit. Hence, as K 1 increases, the relative contribution of the cost saving due to substitutability progressively reduces, resulting in the marginal increase in ∆Z 1 to decrease. Thus, a manufacturer operating at lower values of α and K 1 can benefit relatively more from an increase in θ. Figure 11(b) illustrates the impact of changes in α and β on ∆Z 3 . For this plot, we let K 1 be 20% of base profit and K 2 = K 3 = 0.3. There are two main observations: (i) at low values of α, the value of ∆Z 3 is robust to changes in β and (ii) the marginal increase in ∆Z 3 decreases with increasing α and this effect is prominent at higher values of β. Note that for a fixed value of α, the increase in β impacts demand of both P 0 and P r : as β increases, the demand of P r progressively increases, causing the demand of P 0 to reduce. Since the recycled volume of Module A depends on the demand of P 0 , an increase in β has a negative effect on the cost saving due to substitution. Since this negative impact affects both the numerator and the denominator of ∆Z 3 , the net change due to increasing β can be either positive or negative. Furthermore, as β increases, the cost saving from P r increases, resulting ∆Z 3 to decrease. At low values of α, the profit from P r is less compared to that from P 0 . Moreover, since the supply of P r is less, the increase in profit from P r is bounded. Therefore, at low values of α, the two effects above (of increasing β) on ∆Z 3 are relatively small and counterbalance, resulting in the robust behavior of ∆Z 3 . At moderate to high values of α, due to an ample supply of P r , increasing β results in an increase (resp., decrease) in the profit from P r (resp., P 0 ). Therefore, at higher values of β, both P 0 and P r contribute significantly towards the profit from Option 3. However, as β increases, the increase in profit from P r is larger than the reduction in profit from P 0 . Therefore, the positive impact of substitutability on ∆Z 3 progressively decreases, causing the marginal increase in ∆Z 3 to decrease. This behavior is clearly illustrated in Figure 11 (b). The explanation for the concave increase in ∆Z 3 as α increases is similar to that noted above for ∆Z 1 .
Impact of Ability of Sustainability on Profit
We now examine the behavior of the optimal profit under each option with changes in the take-back fraction (α) and the fraction of green consumers (β). For simplicity of exposition, we fix the value of θ to c a 0 /c b 0 = 1 (our main observations below continue to hold for smaller values of θ). As discussed in Section 6.1, the presence of green consumers does not affect the profit under Option 1; this profit increases as α increases. However, the behavior of the optimal profit under Options 2 and 3 to changes in α and β is nontrivial and is, therefore, our focus in this section. Figure 12 illustrates the behavior of profit under Options 2 and 3 (i.e.,Z 2 andZ 3 , respectively) with an increase in α and β. We use the following parameter setting: K 1 is 30% of the base profit, K 2 = K 3 = 0.3, and δ = 0.4. Figure 12(a) plotsZ 2 against the take-back fraction α. For a given value of β, an increase in α can impactZ 2 in several ways: (i) the volume of disposal of modules A and B increases, (ii) if the demand for P r exceeds supply, then an increase in α reduces the demand-supply gap, resulting in improved profitability, and (iii) if the demand for P r is less than supply, then the increase in α results in lost sales. When there is excess demand for P r , since the disposal cost is lower than the cost saving from remanufacturing, the increase in α impacts profit positively. However, when there are lost sales, the increase in α impacts profit negatively. Furthermore, note that for any given value of β, there is a corresponding value of α at which the demand of P r matches supply. When α is less than this threshold and increasing, we see an increase inZ 2 . When α exceeds this threshold and further increases,Z 2 decreases (Figure 12(a) ).
The behavior ofZ 3 with an increase in α is similar and is demonstrated in Figure 12 (b). In this case, however, the recycling of Module A positively impactsZ 3 . Therefore, as compared toZ 2 , the drop in profit due to increasing α is smaller inZ 3 .
For a fixed value of α, an increase in β increases the demand for P r and reduces the demand for P 0 , and thereby reduces the total take-back quantity. Consequently, we have a two-sided change in the supply-demand gap for P r (i.e., the demand increases and the supply reduces). Furthermore, since the take-back quantity decreases, the volume of disposal also decreases. Therefore, the impacts of increase in β onZ 2 are as follows: (i) cost of disposals decreases, (ii) profit from P 0 reduces, and (iii) profit from P r increases up to a threshold (that depends on α and β) and then remains fixed at that value. Thus, the marginal increase inZ 2 progressively reduces. Finally, note that when lost sales are significant, it is possible for this marginal change inZ 2 to be negative, resulting in a drcrease inZ 2 . This behavior is illustrated in Figure 12 (c).
As discussed in Section 1, changes in either α or β can be achieved through appropriate advertising campaigns or take-back mechanisms. However, as the results above collectively demonstrate, the current values of α and β together determine whether such a change would eventually improve profit. 
Influence of the Relative Savings from Recycling and Remanufacturing
The inherent efficiencies of remanufacturing or recycling processes -which clearly depend on the type of a product and its constituents -vary across industries. In turn, the relative values of K 1 and K 2 , which capture these efficiencies, impact the tradeoff between the options. We now examine the sensitivity of the preferred choice (between Options 1 and 2) to changes in K 1 and K 2 . In particular, we highlight the contrast under low and high values of β. Figure 13 (a) illustrates the change in the superior choice when β is fixed at 5% and α increases. Each contour in the figure is for a specific value of α and corresponds to points where the profits from Options 1 and 2 are the same. Thus, Option 2 (resp., Option 1) dominates in the region above (resp., below) a contour. Consider the set of contours for varying values of α. For a fixed value of K 1 , as α increases, the value of K 2 (corresponding to a contour) first decreases and then increases. This behavior can be explained as follows. Since β is fixed, as α increases, the profit under Option 1 monotonically increases. However, an increase in α increases the supply of P r ; therefore, the profit from P r under Option 2 also increases. Furthermore, since β is low, the profit from P 0 under Option 2 is significant compared to that from P r . Hence, when α is low and increasing, owing to an increase in sales of P r , a lower value of K 2 is sufficient to match the profit under Option 1. Since β is fixed, as α increases further, the supply of P r under Option 2 eventually exceeds its demand, resulting in lost sales. The profit from P 0 , however, remains unchanged. Hence, at higher values of α, a higher value of K 2 is required to counterbalance the decrease in profit due to lost sales under Option 2.
In comparison, when the value of β is considerably high (around 50%), the tradeoff between Options 1 and 2 is markedly different (see Figure 13(b) ). Here, the demand of P r is higher and the demand of P 0 to lower (as compared to the case above, where β was low). The relatively lower production of P 0 decreases the take-back quantity, thereby lowering the supply of P r and resulting in lost sales. Moreover, at higher value of β, the profit from P 0 under Option 2 is comparatively lower. Note that the value of β does not impact the profit under Option 1. Under such a condition, for a fixed value of K 1 , the value of K 2 increases as α increases.
At lower values of β, the choice between Options 1 and 2 exhibits an enhanced sensitivity to changes in K 2 (see Figure 13(a) ). To illustrate, consider a setting where: (i) β is small, (ii) the range of K 1 is about 10%-30% of the base profit, and (iii) the manufacturer's preferred choice is Option 2. If α is low, Option 2 remains the preferred choice over a small increase in α. However, as α further increases, the preferred choice switches from Option 2 to Option 1. Then, since the better of the two options is sensitive to K 2 , a small increase in K 2 would again make Option 2 preferable over Option 1. The required increase in K 2 can be achieved by improving the remanufacturing process. The capital investment for such a change would be typically lower than that required for a similar quantum of improvement in the recycling process. Nevertheless, continuing with Option 2 and the same value of K 2 (where Option 1 is superior) would result in a near-optimal profit.
7 Two Alternative Models: Flexible and Dedicated Green Consumers
In this section, we consider two alternative models:
(i) flexible green consumers: when the demand for P r exceeds its supply, the green consumers who value P 0 higher than its price p 0 , purchase P 0 .
(ii) dedicated green consumers. That is, green consumers do not purchase P 0 .
In the presence of flexible green consumers, the demand for P 0 when only Module B is remanufactured increases as compared to Option 2 (Section 2). Similarly, under dedicated green consumers, the demand for P 0 when only Module A is recycled reduces as compared to Option 1. We provide a detailed analysis of the tradeoff for these two models and also contrast the results with those obtained earlier.
Flexible Green Consumers
In general, the demand for P r is generated from three consumer segments: (i) high-end green consumers,
(ii) low-end green consumers, and (iii) low-end regular consumers. Here, by high-end (resp., low-end) green consumers, we mean those with λ ≥ p 0 (resp., p r ≤ λ < p 0 ); see Section 2.2. Also, low-end regular consumers refers to those with λ < p 0 and δλ ≥ p r . When P r is not in the market, high-end green consumers purchase P 0 , whereas when both products exist in the market they only purchase P r .
However, in the presence of flexible green consumers, when both products are in the market and there is an insufficient supply of P r , the high-end green consumers switch back to P 0 . To facilitate this setting, we assume that, in case of an insufficient supply of P r , the satisfied percentages of each of the three populations above are proportional to their respective fractions of the total demand of P r .
Under the switching behavior of high-end green consumers, we refer to Option 2 as Option 2 s and denote the corresponding profit function by Π 2 s . The demand from high-end green consumers is 
where 
The following result characterizes the conditions under which Option 1 dominates Option 2 s . Let the optimal profit under Option 2 s beZ s 2 . The proof of Theorem 6 is similar to that of Theorems 1 and 2 and, therefore, avoided. 
(1−pr) Therefore, we focus only on the region defined by
, the profit from P 0 exceeds the sum of the profit from P r and the cost of disposal. Thus, only P 0 exists in the market and Option 1 is dominant. As α increases, the increasing cost of disposal makes remanufacturing preferable.
This, in turn, enables us to satisfy (a portion of) the demand from high-end green consumers and low-end (green and regular) consumers. Thus, increasing α increases the profit under Option 2 s . Also, the unsatisfied high-end green consumers switch to P 0 (since they are flexible), which also positively impacts profit. Consequently, after a threshold, defined by α = (
becomes the better option. Together, the higher production of P 0 (necessitated by flexibility) and the indirect increase in the production of P r (due to the higher take-back quantity) in the region defined by A 1 > 0 results in higher profit for Option 2 s as compared to Option 2. Therefore, the domain of optimality of Option 2 s is larger than that of Option 2; see Figures 7 and Figure 14 (a).
Dedicated Green Consumers
Under dedicated consumers, let Option 1 g denote the case when only Module A is recycled and let Z g 1 be the corresponding optimal profit. Note that Option 2 remains unaffected. We characterize the tradeoff between Options 1 g and 2.
Theorem 7 If p r > δp 0 , thenZ Figure 14 (b) illustrates the domains of optimality of Options 1 g and 2. We compare these two options in two regions: A 1 < 0 and A 1 ≥ 0. Under dedicated green consumers, the demand for P 0 is the same (equal ofQ 0 ) under both Options 1 g and 2. When A 1 < 0 (where supply of P r exceeds its demand), we have the following behavior: (i) the amount of units remanufactured (Q r ) under Option 2 is less than the amount recycled (αQ 0 ) under Option 1 g , (ii) the cost saving due to recycling steadily increases as α increases, (iii) when β is fixed, the cost saving from remanufacturing reduces as α increases (since the cost of disposal increases), thus making Option 1 g preferable, and (iv) when α is fixed, the cost saving from remanufacturing increases as β increases (since the supply-demand gap of P r decreases), making Option 2 preferable. Thus, when A 1 < 0, at lower values of β and higher values of α, Option 1 g is better than Option 2. Now consider the case when A 1 ≥ 0. Under Option 2, the insufficient supply of P r results in lost sales. Also, recall that the demand for P 0 and the total take-back quantity are the same for Options 1 g and 2 (Q 0 and αQ 0 , respectively). Thus, number of units recycled under Option 1 g is the same as that remanufactured under Option 2 (both numbers equal αQ 0 ). Therefore, the tradeoff between Option 1 g and 2 is simply that between cost savings from recycling and remanufacturing (i.e, between K 1 and K 2 ). Since K 2 > K 1 in Figure 14 
Future Research Directions
There are several directions along which future research can proceed. We offer the following suggestions:
• Manufacturer-Driven Product Substitution: An interesting possibility would be to consider the substitutability of P 0 for P r . That is, the manufacturer can supply P 0 instead of P r and absorb the difference in production costs. Manufacturer driven substitution, also referred to as lateral transshipment, has been well-studied in the operations management literature; see, e.g., Robinson (1990); Drezner, Gurnani, and Pasternack (1995) ; Bassok, Anupindi, and Akella (1999); Gurnani and Drezner (2000) ; Rudi, Kapur, and Pyke (2001); Axsater (2003) . Under substitution, in addition to the demands of P 0 and P r that are met by producing the respective products, we would also have to decide the demand for P r that is satisfied by P 0 . Apart from the improved ability to satisfy demand, such a practice would also result in an increase in the take-back quantity (as compared to the situation under no substitution) and, in turn, enable more production of P 0 and P r .
• Yield Uncertainties: The issue of uncertainty of the yields in the take-back fraction, the recovery of modules, and the extraction of raw material has been discussed in the literature; see e.g., Bakal
and Akcali (2006); Ferrer and Whybark (2001) ; Galbreth and Blackburn (2006) ; Guide et al. (2000) ; Toktay, Wein, and Zenios (2000) . In general, one would expect both the nature and extent of the individual impacts of yield uncertainties on recycling and remanufacturing to be asymmetric. Consequently, their influence on the tradeoff between remanufacturing and recycling can be both interesting and challenging.
• Joint Pricing under Competition: Under the simultaneous presence of the remanufactured product P r and the recycled product P 0 , solving their joint pricing problem under varying ability of sustainability (i.e., varying α, β, and θ) is an important problem. Note that, owing to the tradeoff between P 0 and P r , this pricing problem is relevant even under a monopolistic setting. A further enhancement could be to incorporate competition. The study of a joint pricing problem under competition can also utilize the analysis in Debo, Toktay, and Van Wassenhove (2005) . We show that a 3 > 0 by establishing that a 3 ≥ a 2 . Although we do not use this relationship explicitly in the following proof, it facilitates a better understanding of the conditions stated in the theorem.
As in the proof of Theorem 1, the argument below is reversible. So, we only present the proof in the forward direction. IfZ 1 >Z 2 , we can rewrite (3) as follows:
where K δ(1−δ) + β(1 − p r ). Hence, αQ 0 > Q r . Therefore, from (6), αβ(a 2 K 4 ) + β(a 3 K 2 − a 2 K 3 ) − α(a 5 K 1 − δa 4 K 4 ) + a 4 (K 2 − δK 3 ) < 0 (b) a 2 αβ + a 3 β − a 2 α + a 4 ≥ 0, then using a similar argument, we have αQ 0 ≤ Q r . From (6) we have,
The result follows. Thus, the conditionZ 1 >Z 3 G can be written as follows:
(a) If αβ + a 1 β − α < 0, then α(1 − β)(1 − p 0 ) > β(1 − p r ). Therefore, αQ 0 > Q r . Hence, from (7),
